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1. Introduction 
When discussing Iris Murdoch’s moral philosophy 
it is often easiest to start by saying what she is opposing. 
Such is the case also in this paper, which concerns 
Murdoch’s views of our identity as persons or “selves”. The 
good enemy against which Murdoch writes is what she 
calls the “current”, the “modern”, or the “liberal” view of 
morals. This is a view whose essential features are shared 
by such apparently quite different philosophers as, for 
example, R. M. Hare or J. P. Sartre, and whose ancestors 
are Hume, Kant and Mill (VC, 34). One of the several 
critical characterizations Murdoch applies to the picture of 
the individual contained in this view is “existentialist”. In 
Murdoch’s account, such philosophers as Sartre, who 
claims the title, as well as others who do not, are 
existentialist when they emphasize the solitary omnipotent 
will at the cost of the substantial self, that is, if they identify 
“the true person with the empty choosing will” (S, 9, 35). 
Murdoch’s objection to this picture might be put as follows: 
by making morality a matter of a solitary choosing will, the 
view neglects ordinary human moral experience and 
instead builds an empty abstraction which it then elevates 
into a “man-God”, the moral super hero of modern times.  
Having said this as an introduction, I shall leave 
aside the details of Murdoch’s objections, as well as the 
question of their accuracy. Instead, I shall draw a sketch of 
her positive viewpoints of the matter, the view of human 
identity which she sets against the “current view”. In her 
view, man is set “against a background of values, of 
realities, which transcend him” (AD, 290). I shall explore 
the transcendental argument by which Murdoch aims to 
establish this. This is an argument concerning the concept 
of “Good” as a unifier of our experience and hence, as a 
condition of our being persons. The argument is, in fact, 
“not of the most rigorous kind”, as Murdoch puts it herself. 
However, when it is supported by imaginative appeals to 
experience (metaphors, new concepts) and by moral 
reasons for its acceptance, it seems - not only to Murdoch, 
but also to many philosophers inspired by her - that it can 
support an attractive alternative to the picture of the man 
presented by the current view. The aforementioned moral 
reasons are taken up at the end of this paper. They are 
reasons for replacing the man-God with other kinds of 
sacred objects, with goodness as exhibited in contingent 
particular beings such as real people. 
 
2. Good and the Self 
According to Murdoch, moral philosophy in the 
contemporary secularised world should retain a concept 
which has the characteristics formerly attributed to God. 
Her suggestion for such a concept is “Good”, characterized 
as  “a single perfect transcendent non-representable and 
necessarily real object of attention” (S, 55). However, 
when speaking of the reality, or necessary existence of 
Good she wants to avoid “any heavy material connotation 
of the misleading word ‘exist’” (S, 64). So in which sense 
does Good exist? In my interpretation, it exists as a 
condition of experience. In other words, one can in 
Murdoch’s philosophy find a transcendental argument that 
proceeds from our human experience to the necessary 
conditions of this experience. The experience central to the 
argument is one concerning moral progress, or what 
Murdoch also calls our “pilgrimage”. It involves a strong 
sense of direction on one hand and the knowledge that it is 
someone’s - a particular person’s - experience on the other 
(S, 22-23).  
Let us first examine the idea of direction. Murdoch 
asks: “Are we not certain that there is a ‘true direction’ 
towards better conduct, that goodness ‘really matters’?” (S, 
60). She claims that in all our evaluations we use a 
standard of excellence, which cannot be found in the 
evaluated things themselves. This standard is the idea of 
perfection, which brings scales and distances to the area 
under assessment. Such scales and distances are 
necessary for all thinking. In order to understand any 
domain of life, we have to be able to relate things to each 
other, classify them as better or worse, important or not - in 
short, evaluate. As so often in her philosophy, Murdoch 
here takes art as an example. Learning to understand 
some art form means learning to evaluate its objects 
according to degrees of excellence. This activity also 
reveals that there is “little that is very good and nothing 
that is perfect”. (S, 61-61.) The same goes for all human 
activity. We know that even the best are not perfect. This 
knowledge is, nevertheless, made possible by the idea of 
perfection that brings with it the sense of a right or a wrong 
direction in which one can move. 
Murdoch compares her argument concerning the 
idea of perfection to the ontological proof which, rather 
than a proof, is an “assertion of faith”, appropriate for those 
already convinced (S, 63). In other words, it can only be 
made on the basis of some experience of Good as 
perfection (or God in Anselm’s case). If one wants to 
speak of proof, it is a proof an individual can ultimately give 
only to herself, not a universal moral formula seen valid by 
virtue of rationality only (MGM, 392). Not so much the 
formal qualities of the argument but the experience out of 
which it arises makes in convincing. However, the moral 
philosopher can help even the sceptic to find the proof 
within herself by “appeal to certain areas of experience, 
pointing out certain features, and using suitable metaphors 
and inventing suitable concepts where necessary to make 
these features visible”(S, 75). Then, if a person can find 
hierarchies of value in her experience, she will, according 
to Murdoch, also find the idea of perfection as the end 
point of them. Hence, if successful, the moral philosopher 
can make the sceptic discover the evaluative nature of all 
her thinking: to discover that in this sense she really is a 
believer of Good. From this one can proceed to 
understanding how Good also functions as a condition for 
the unity of our experience and ultimately for our being 
persons with particular identities. 
Murdoch claims that “if there is any kind of sense 
or unity in human life [...] it must be sought within a human 
experience” (S, 79). Unity is experienced by someone. The 
notion of a person or individual is, according to Murdoch, 
inseparable from morality. In her view, the movement 
towards Good can be described as activity that aims at an 
increasing precision of moral concepts, and such activity is 
highly personal. Our moral vocabulary is of course subject 
to some public rules, and our concepts are derived from a 
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public context. However, we take these concepts “into our 
privacy”, where we can reassess them. For Murdoch, this 
in fact is the main characteristic of “live personality”. Within 
certain limits, an individuals use of moral concepts is a 
function of her history. (S, 25-26.) Moreover, as (and if) our 
understanding of moral concepts grows, we also become 
increasingly aware of their relationships and hierarchies. 
“Increasing moral sophistication reveals increasing unity”, 
Murdoch notes (S, 57). Hence, whatever unity there is in 
our experience it is there due to our ability to evaluate, and 
to Good that provides the standard for these evaluations. 
Good is compared by Murdoch to a magnetic centre of 
reflection, or (her favourite image) the sun outside the 
Platonic cave, in the light of which we can see the world 
properly, but which itself is very difficult to look at (if at all 
possible). Without Good we would have no sense of 
direction in our lives and therefore no unity of experience. 
In other words, we have to evaluate in order to be 
integrated persons. How we evaluate is in turn a function 
of our individual histories, our struggles for increased 
precision of our moral concepts. In this way Good and our 
movement towards it is also a condition of all the 
experience we call our own experience, and, hence, a 
condition of our having “a self”.  
This is my (admittedly sketchy) reproduction of the 
“transcendental argument” by which Murdoch supports her 
view of the human being as set against a background of 
value.1 Of this picture she then asks, whether we cannot 
find just this in our deepest experience (see MGE, 507).  
 
3. Good and Unselfing 
However, the question of why we should accept 
her picture is not just a question of experience. Since all 
our thinking is evaluative, the question is also evaluative: 
whether this is not the picture of us that we should accept 
for moral reasons. Every moral system is, according to 
Murdoch, reflecting an evaluative vision, commanding an 
ideal. And since this cannot be avoided, it is important that 
the system is commanding a worthy ideal (S, 78). I come 
now to what I think are Murdoch’s moral reasons for 
preferring the ideal she is presenting to the one implied by 
the “existentialist” current view. 
The idea of Good as the unifier of our experience 
avoids at least two moral dangers tightly connected to the 
existentialist view of the person. Both of these dangers 
have to do with the notion of freedom that goes with the 
existentialist view. In it, freedom is identified with an empty 
choosing will, as Murdoch puts it (S, 36). The creator of 
value is the will, whereas the world outside the moral agent 
consists of facts. So we are talking about the famous fact-
value distinction, which Murdoch was among the first to 
criticise (see, Diamond 1996, 79). In the existentialist view, 
the human being moves against a background of facts, 
and it is at her will to choose how she evaluates these 
facts. The moral agent is “free to withdraw, survey the 
facts, and choose again”. (VC, 83)  
One problem is that this picture of human freedom 
tends to marginalise the ethical. It sees facts as that which 
human beings share with each other. We can discuss our 
moral differences by reference to, and clarification of, the 
facts relevant to the question. If there is no agreement on 
what the facts are, that is, if the disagreement concerns 
“purely values”, the argumentation becomes more difficult 
and perhaps impossible. (VC, 81). But this is the area 
where the solitary will moves - it is “marooned upon a tiny 
island in the middle of a sea of scientific facts”, or to use 
                                                     
1 For a detailed but somewhat different account of Murdoch’s transcendental 
argument see Antonaccio, 2000, chapt. 5. 
 
another of Murdoch’s metaphors, we have “a big world of 
facts, little peripheral area of value” (S, 27 MGE, 25). 
Another problem is that in the existentialist view 
the solitary will, supposedly stripped from a metaphysical 
background, is turned into a hero figure. It is affirmed that 
an agent, identified with her will, can attain an authentic 
existence by sheer force of that will alone. Such a strong 
emphasis on the freedom of the individual will is, however, 
more likely to enhance than constrain selfish impulses, 
which according to Murdoch are so fundamental to human 
beings. She describes the human psyche in Freudian 
terms as a “historically determined individual relentlessly 
looking after itself” or also as a “fat relentless ego”. This 
ego is the enemy of moral life and thus moral philosophy is 
properly the discussion of techniques for its defeat. The 
question for moral philosophers is “how can we make 
ourselves better?” (S, 50-52, 78.) In modern moral 
philosophy Kant’s original quest for finding something 
clean and pure outside the selfish empirical psyche has 
only lead back again to the self and degenerated into a 
“Luciferian philosophy of adventures of the will” (S, 48, 83), 
which looks more like another project of self-
aggrandizement of the selfish ego than an answer to the 
question how to make ourselves better. 
Murdoch’s metaphysical picture is drawn as a 
guard against these moral dangers.2 It points at the 
evaluative aspect of all thinking. Valuing is not one 
(peripheral) kind of cognitive activity among others, but 
rather the condition of any cognitive activity, the condition 
for there being persons who think. As such, valuing is not 
something we can choose whether or not to do. This is 
what Murdoch means by saying that the idea of the Good 
lies beyond our experience and exercises its authority from 
there (S, 62-63). Taking seriously this picture of Good as 
the condition for our being selves in the first place should 
also humble the fat ego. Rather than me being the creator 
of value, value creates me.  
Murdoch’s answer to the question how we can 
make ourselves better is: by paying attention to the Good. 
However, as stated in the beginning, Good is a “non-
representable object of attention”. There is no immediate 
way of encountering it - it exists as the ideal endpoint of 
those hierarchies of value that we can perceive. This 
means that moral improvement is improvement of vision: it 
requires close attention to what lies outside of the selfish 
mechanism of the human psyche. Murdoch characterizes 
the proper kind of attention (following Simone Weil) as “a 
just and loving gaze directed upon an individual reality” (S, 
34). The most important and most difficult individual 
realities for our attention are other people. Cultivating 
one’s vision in order to see beyond the self to other 
individual selves is true moral activity. This calls for what 
Murdoch refers to as “techniques of unselfing”. Attending 
to Iris Murdoch’s philosophy can be recommended as one 
such technique.3 
 
 
 
                                                     
2 Murdoch does note that her picture involves moral dangers of its own, 
although she claims in a rather self-assured manner that “we know roughly 
how to deal with these dangers and part of moral life is to deal with them” (VC, 
91-91). 
 
3 I would like to thank Nicholas Barlow and Petter Korkman for their insightful 
comments that helped me to improve this paper. 
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